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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article suggests that the Employment Division v. Smith decision was
predictable.' Smith is an intellectually uninquisitive and reflexive decision that
reinforces embedded cultural notions about religion and religious exemptions.
It is more an example of what Justice Cardozo would have considered
unreflective judging than it is an example of bias against religious minorities or
exemptions, as has often been suggested.2 In fact, it would have been possible
for the Smith Court to come to the same conclusion in a more reflective and
open fashion, but that would have required the Court to grapple with
uncomfortable embedded cultural notions about "general applicability" and
about religious practices.
* Professor of Law and Walter H. Stowers Chair in Law and Religion, Director of the Kyoto, Japan
Summer Abroad Program, Michigan State University College of Law. The author would like to thank Jesse
Choper, Arnold Loewy, Bill Marshall, William Van Alstyne, and John Taylor for participating in the panel at
the 2011 Criminal Law Symposium: Criminal Law & the FirstAmendment at Texas Tech University School
of Law on April 8, 2011, which gave rise to this Article, and for their stimulating and interesting comments
and papers. He would also like to thank Dean Akira Morita and the Doshisha University Law School in
Kyoto, Japan, without whose facilities and kindness parts of this Article would have been significantly harder
to research. As always, he would like to thank Dean Joan Howarth and his colleagues at MSU College of
Law, who give the best research support any researcher could hope for as well as the stimulating intellectual
environment to write. Finally, the author would like to thank his research assistants Philip Berens, Heather
Snider, Elena Rozdowski, Jonathon Warner, and Jim Zeihmer for their work researching this project.
1. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) [hereinafter Emp't
Div. v. Smith), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L.No. 103-
141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)).
2. See BENJAMIN CARDOzO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 167-68 (22d prtg 1964) (1921).
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The Smith majority seemed unequipped to do so. This is demonstrated by
its failure to seriously grapple with precedent such as Sherbert v. Verner and
Wisconsin v. Yoder, which would have required it to ask some of the
uncomfortable questions it did not address. As this Article suggests, Sherbert
and Yoder were never the panacea they have been made out to be because
various majorities of the Court, both before and after those cases, shared the
Smith Court's embedded horizons on those issues. There is, however, an
example of a court that overcame other culturally embedded horizons on
religion and legal/cultural uniformity. That court confronted some of the
questions the Smith Court simply presumed the answers to and created a much
more interesting legal approach. The Japanese Supreme Court in Matsumoto v.
Kobayashi, a case discussed in detail later in this Article, provides this
example.4
II. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE AND
EMPLOYMENT DIVISION V. SMITH
Most readers of this Article and attendees of its preceding symposium are
already familiar with Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence and the role of
Employment Division v. Smith in that jurisprudence. This section provides a
brief introduction to Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence and to Smith, for those
who are not familiar with this fascinating area of law. This section also
provides a focus on some of the issues raised in Smith that are addressed later in
the Article.
In Smith, Native American employees of a drug rehabilitation center were
fired and subsequently denied unemployment benefits because they used peyote
at a ritual service.5 There was no evidence that these employees used peyote at
any time other than in the ritual services; in fact, their religion forbade use of
6the substance outside of ritual ceremonies. The employees sued under the Free
Exercise Clause to recover their unemployment benefits.' In an opinion written
by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court held that the state need not create
exemptions to laws of general applicability to accommodate religious
practices.8 The opinion noted, however, that states remained free to create
exemptions to laws that have an adverse impact on religious practices.9
3. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
4. See Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 8, 1996, 1995 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 74,50 SAIKO SABANSHO MINJI
HANREISHO [MINSHOJ 469 (Japan); infra Part IV.
5. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
6. GARRETr Epps, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 62 (2001).
7. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
8. Id. at 885.
9. Id. at 892.
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The facts of the case are well documented.'o As noted above, two
members of the Native American Church were denied unemployment benefits
after being fired from their jobs at a substance abuse rehabilitation center.I1
The employees were fired because they had chewed peyote, an illegal substance
under Oregon law, during religious rituals.12 Oregon law stated that being fired
for misconduct-which is how the firing was characterized-precludes the
receipt of unemployment benefits.13 Neither individual abused peyote and there
was no evidence that either had used peyote anywhere other than in religious
ceremonies.14 In fact, it would violate the tenets of the Native American
Church to use peyote outside of appropriate religious rituals because the
substance has significant religious import for members of the faith.' 5 Oregon,
unlike many states and the Federal Government, did not have a religious
exemption for Native American peyote use under its general drug laws.16 Thus,
the Court had to decide whether the two men denied unemployment benefits
had a constitutional right to an exemption to the drug laws, given the religious
nature of their peyote use.17 An exemption would have precluded the denial of
unemployment benefits based on ritual peyote use. 18
The backdrop of legal precedent seemed to favor the men, but that
precedent, contrary to popular belief, was anything but clear or terribly helpful
to religious minorities. The precedent many thought would be key to the
decision was Sherbert v. Verner, which held that a state must have a compelling
governmental interest for denying unemployment benefits to a person who was
fired for refusing to work on her Sabbath.' 9 Relevant, but not a deciding factor
in the Sherbert opinion, was the fact that the state unemployment laws
20
contained a number of exemptions for nonreligious reasons.
10. See generally EPPS, supra note 6 (providing an excellent discussion of the underlying facts and
setting forth some possible liberties taken by the Smith majority with the facts).
11. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See Respondents' Brief at 1-5, Emp't Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988) (Nos. 86-946, 86-947),
1987 WL 880316 at * 1-5; Garrett Epps, To An Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment Division
v. Smith, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 962-63, 981-85 (1998).
15. Garrett Epps, What We Talk About When We Talk About Free Exercise, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 563, 583
(1998) ("An uncontroverted part of the record was the relentless opposition by the peyote religion to the use of
peyote outside the ritual context, and to the use of other drugs and alcohol for any reason whatsoever."); see
Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 913-14 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
16. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (noting that several states, including Arizona, Colorado, and New
Mexico, have made exceptions for religious use of peyote).
17. Id. at 874.
18. Id
19. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
20. Id at 406; see also Douglas Laycock, The Remnants ofFree Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 50
(1990) ("The other point in the Court's explanation of its unemployment compensation cases is secular
exemptions. If the state grants exemptions from its law for secular reasons, then it must grant comparable
exemptions for religious reasons.... In general, the allowance of any exemption is substantial evidence that
religious exemptions would not threaten the statutory scheme.").
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Another decision, Wisconsin v. Yoder, was also relevant. 2 1 In Yoder, the
Court held that Amish families with high school age children were entitled to
exemptions from the state's compulsory education laws in the absence of a
compelling state interest for the laws.22 The Court looked at the Amish
community's track record of good citizenship, hard work, and the success of its
young people within the community to demonstrate that the state had no
compelling interest for denying the exemption.23 There have been some serious
criticisms of the Court's approach in Yoder,24 but for present purposes this
basic overview of the Court's holding is adequate.
Given this precedent, most people believed that the battle lines in Smith
would be drawn over whether the State had an adequate, compelling
governmental interest.25  In fact, Oregon's attorney general at that time later
pointed out that the State never argued for disposing of the compelling interest
26test. Rather, the State argued that compliance with the state's drug laws
satisfied the burden under that test, especially in light of post-Sherbert and
-Yoder case law.27 As will be seen, that subsequent case law suggested that
Sherbert and Yoder were primarily paper tigers, at least in the United States
Supreme Court.
Between Yoder and Smith, the Court decided a string of free exercise
exemption cases.28 With the exception of a few unemployment cases, the
person seeking the exemption never won.29 In some cases, the nature of the
government institution, i.e., the military or prisons, served as a basis for not
21. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
22. Id. at 235-36.
23. Id. at 222-27, 234-36.
24. See id. at 241-42 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Richard J. Arneson & Ian Shapiro, Democratic Autonomy
and Religious Freedom: A Critique ofWisconsin v. Yoder, in 38 POLITICAL ORDER 365, 365-68 (lan Shapiro
& Russell Hardin eds., 1996); Stephen M. Feldman, Religious Minorities and the First Amendment: The
History, the Doctrine, and the Future, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 222, 252-56 (2003) (noting that Yoder "illustrates
the importance of Christianity for a successful free exercise exemption claim"); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing
the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation ofReligion, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
555, 563 n.17 (1991).
25. Epps, supra note 14, at 992; id. at 1015 ("[A]ll the parties were shocked at how the Court had
decided [Smith]. Most observers, both at the time and later, have concluded that ... the Court rewrote the
entire jurisprudence of the Free Exercise Clause...."); see also id. at 956-57 nn.l 1-12 (citing many legal and
journalistic commentators criticizing Smith soon after it was decided).
26. See Brief for Petitioners, Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (No. 88-1213), 1989 WL
1126846 at *11-16; Epps, supra note 14, at 990, 1012-15. This statement was also confirmed in a
conversation I had with former Oregon Attorney General Dave Frohnmayer in Kyoto, Japan, in 2001 when we
both spoke at a forum addressing the free exercise of religion at Doshisha University, where Frohnmayer was
speaking as the President of the University of Oregon, and I was a Fulbright Scholar at the Faculty of Law at
Doshisha University.
27. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 26, at *11-16; Epps, supra note 14, at 990, 1012-15.
28. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 883-84.
29. See id. In fact, no non-Christian has ever won a Free Exercise Clause exemption case before the
United States Supreme Court, and even most Christians have lost such cases. See Mark Tushnet, "OfChurch
and State and the Supreme Court": Kurland Revisited, 1989 SUP. CT. REv. 373, 381 (1989).
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applying the compelling interest test.30 In others, the relief requested was
decisive in not applying the compelling interest test-for example, cases in
which the government entity involved would have had to change its policies to
grant an exemption.3 ' Finally, there were cases in which the Court ostensibly
applied the compelling interest test but in a manner that made it anything but
32
strict scrutiny. It should be noted, however, that Sherbert and Yoder did
influence the outcomes of some lower court cases.33
The Smith Court relied on the post-Yoder decisions, as well as some pre-
Sherbert decisions, to hold that Sherbert is limited to the unemployment
context, in which there are generally a variety of exemptions built into the
unemployment laws.34 Furthermore, the claim in Smith was different from
earlier free exercise cases granting exemptions to unemployment laws. 5 The
claimants in Smith sought exemptions based on illegal conduct, while the
claimants in the earlier cases sought exemptions based on religious conduct that
was otherwise legal. 6 Yoder was harder to distinguish, but the Court created
the concept of "hybrid rights"-and I stress the word "created" because the
concept makes no legal sense, as explained below. 37 Hybrid-rights cases are
30. See, e.g., O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349-50 (1987) (applying a test other than the
compelling interest test to a prison setting); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507-11 (1986) (declining
to apply the compelling interest test to a military setting).
31. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 706-11 (1986).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260-62 (1982).
33. See, e.g., Dayton Christian Sch., Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932, 949-55 (6th Cir.
1985) (holding that the school's free exercise rights were violated by application of civil rights laws), rev'don
other grounds, 477 U.S. 619 (1986); McCurry v. Tesch, 738 F.2d 271, 275-77 (8th Cir. 1984) (enforcing a
state order against operation of a church school in violation of state law infringed the church's free exercise
rights); Warner v. Graham, 675 F. Supp. 1171, 1177-81 (D.N.D. 1987) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause
was violated when plaintiff lost her job because of sacramental peyote use), rev d, 845 F.2d 179 (8th Cir.
1988); United States v. Lewis, 638 F. Supp. 573, 577-81 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (holding that a rule requiring the
government to consent to waiver of a jury trial violated defendants' free exercise rights); United States v.
Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301, 1307-08 (D.N.M. 1986) (discussing that the Bald Eagle Protection Act violated
defendant's free exercise rights); EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 609 F. Supp. 344, 346-49 (N.D. Cal.
1984) (holding that the school could not use the Free Exercise Clause to defend its benefits policy), affd, 781
F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986); Congregation Beth Yitzchok of Rockland, Inc. v. Town of Ramapo, 593 F. Supp.
655, 658-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that regulations interfering with a congregation's operation of its
nursery school violated the Free Exercise Clause); Chapman v. Pickett, 491 F. Supp. 967, 971 & n.1, 972
(C.D. Ill. 1980) (explaining that the free exercise rights of a Black Muslim prisoner were violated by his
punishment for refusal to follow order to handle pork), vacated, 484 U.S. 807 (1987); Geller v. Sec'yofDef.,
423 F. Supp. 16, 17-18 (D.D.C. 1976) (holding that a regulation denying a Jewish chaplain his right to wear
facial hair violated his free exercise rights); Lincoln v. True, 408 F. Supp. 22, 23-24 (W.D. Ky. 1975)
(discussing that the denial of unemployment compensation to claimant whose employment was terminated for
religious reasons infringed her free exercise rights); Am. Friends Serv. Comm. v. United States, 368 F. Supp.
1176, 1182-85 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (holding that a tax-withholding statute violates plaintiffs' free exercise rights),
rev'd, 419 U.S. 7 (1974); Nicholson v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Ala. State Bar Ass'n, 338 F. Supp. 48, 57-59
(M.D. Ala. 1972) (explaining that the statutory oath required of applicant for admission to state bar infringed
on applicant's free exercise rights).
34. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883-84(1990).
35. See id. at 874-75, 878.
36. Id.
37. See id at 881-82.
263
HeinOnline  -- 44 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 263 2011-2012
TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW
cases in which the Free Exercise Clause right is connected to some other
important right (for example, parental rights in Yoder).38 This concept was
used to distinguish several earlier cases that involved freedom of expression as
well as free exercise concerns and to distinguish Yoder." Yet, to characterize
Yoder as a hybrid-rights case is patently disingenuous.
Moreover, the concept of "hybrid rights" makes no sense whatsoever. Is
the Court saying that two inadequate constitutional rights combined can make
an adequate one? If so, it would not be hard to hybridize almost anything into a
viable constitutional right. Or are hybrid rights the combination of two
adequate constitutional rights? This possibility is precluded by the Smith Court
because, under its reasoning, the Free Exercise Clause right would clearly be
inadequate by itself in an exemption case.4 This dilemma leaves two
possibilities. First, the other constitutional right in the hybrid-rights context
would be adequate on its own and the Free Exercise Clause right would not-in
which case, why mention the Free Exercise Clause in exemption cases if it
essentially serves no function other than being an antidiscrimination
principle? 41 Second, hybrid rights may just be a judicial creation used to get
around inconvenient precedent.42 The last possibility seems to be the obvious
answer.43
The mischaracterization of Yoder would be more troubling if the
traditional story of Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence were accurate, but the
reality is that Sherbert and Yoder were never the panacea they have been made
out to be." The idea of a compelling interest test held a lot of promise, but in
38. See id; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (linking the Free Exercise Clause
right with the parental right to the religious upbringing of children).
39. See Smith, 494 U.S at 881-82.
40. See generally id (stating that courts use other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech
or freedom of the press, in combination with the Free Exercise Clause to exempt religious groups from
following certain laws).
41. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532-34 (1993). Of
course, such an antidiscrimination principle could be covered under the Equal Protection Clause and perhaps
the Establishment Clause, which raises the question of whether the Free Exercise Clause serves any function
under the Smith Court's reasoning other than in unemployment cases.
42. See id. at 566-67 (Scalia, J., concurring).
43. See Maxine Eichner, Who Should Control Children's Education?: Parents, Children, andthe State,
75 U. CIN. L. REv. 1339, 1384-857 (2007); Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith and the Decline of
Supreme Court Centrism, 1993 BYU L. REV. 259, 266-67 (1993); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise
Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1120-22 (1990).
44. See FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE 98-99 (1995); John
Thomas Bannon, Jr., The Legality of the Religious Use of Peyote by the Native American Church: A
Commentary on the Free Exercise, Equal Protection, and Establishment Issues Raised by the Peyote Way
Church of God Case, 22 Am. INDIAN L. REV. 475, 484 (1998); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G.
Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 446-47
(1994); Lino A. Graglia, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye: OfAnimal Sacrifice and Religious Persecution,
85 GEO. L.J. 1, 16 (1996); Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox into
the Henhouse Under Cover ofSection 5 ofthe Fourteenth Amendment, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 385 n.101
(1994); Ira C. Lupu, The LingeringDeath ofSeparationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230,237 (1993); Robert
W. Tuttle, How Firm a Foundation? Protecting Religious Land Uses After Boeme, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
861, 871-72 (2000).
[Vol. 44:259264
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the hands of shifting majorities on the Court, that promise was never realized.
It was sometimes realized in the lower courts, however.45
Divorcing Smith from all the important baggage regarding stare decisis,
etc., we are left with the basic notion that the Free Exercise Clause does not
require exemptions to generally applicable laws.46 The argument seems to be
the following: because these laws are religion neutral, the Free Exercise Clause
has no impact on them except through the political process. 47 This is, of
course, a claim of formal neutrality. But how is formal neutrality "neutral" in
this context? One might ask this in the language of Smith: how can a law be
generally applicable in this context? The concurring and dissenting opinions in
Smith essentially ask this question and answer that the laws are neither neutral
48
nor generally applicable for free exercise purposes.
Here, there may be a dichotomy between claims of neutrality and general
applicability. The law without religious exemptions is not neutral, whether
viewed from the perspective of free exercise or from that of the legal regime as
a whole. 49 The Court admits as much in suggesting that no one is entitled to a
religious exemption, and religious minorities might be at a disadvantage when
attempting to get exemptions through the political process.o Whatever baseline
one sets for neutrality in this context, neither the result nor the baseline can be
proven neutral.5' Yet, one might set two different baselines for general
applicability in this case: one that views general applicability without regard to
the nature of the claim, and one that views general applicability specifically in
the free exercise context. From the latter perspective, the law is not generally
applicable because it places a significant burden on those whose religious
practices require a violation of the law. From the former perspective, the law is
generally applicable because it applies to all citizens, even if it may have a
differing impact on some. This, of course, simply begs the question.
How does one choose between these baselines? Certainly, the choice is
not based on the tortured use of precedent by both the majority and dissenting
opinions in Smith. So what really allowed the Justices to choose? We will, of
course, never know for sure, but it seems the majority presumed that it is
religion neutral to analyze the general applicability of the law without regard to
the nature of the claim. 5 2 Otherwise, the Court's reasoning makes no sense. If
the law was not religion neutral in the free exercise context, then it was not
45. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
46. See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888-89 (1990).
47. See generally id. at 890 (stating that the government can pass legislation to exempt religious groups
from following particular laws).
48. Id. at 906-07 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 907-09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
49. See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
50. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
51. See FRANK S. RAVITCH, MASTERS OF ILLUSION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE RELIGION
CLAUSES 13-36 (2007).
52. See generally id. at 13-17 (arguing that because the Court relies on formal neutrality, it does not
consider the effects of the underlying claim); Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3 (comparing the religion neutral
analysis to the race and free speech analyses).
265
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generally applicable because it would apply differently to different religious
groups:
The governing precedent was mixed; although it does seem the majority
opinion took some liberties with precedent. In the end the Court had to
answer the question, as the Sherbert Court tried to do, what does the Free
Exercise Clause mean, and how should it be applied to exemptions from laws
that are not directly aimed at religion? By relying on general applicability
and facial neutrality, the Court never seriously engages this question. The
answer is presumed-general applicability/neutrality is determinative because
that is what the Free Exercise Clause requires. Why? Because generally
applicable laws cannot burden free exercise in a constitutionally significant
way. Why? Because we said so.... Even if one were to argue that general
applicability has meaning separate from its implicit neutrality claim, one is
left trying to determine if the laws of general applicability approach used by
the Court is adequately supported by an appropriate mode of religion clause
interpretation. Neutrality is used here to avoid carefully answering the tough
question of what the Free Exercise Clause requires and why.53
In the end, there is a complete disjunction between the Court's assumptions
about free exercise and even basic understandings of religion. Because the
Court was analyzing the free exercise of religion, this disjunction seems
troubling.
Many scholars have recognized the tension between the Supreme Court's
approach to free exercise exemptions and the theological underpinnings of
some religious traditions.54 This Article suggests that the dynamic in this
context was affected by the preconceptions of judges and justices regarding
what religion is and what the Free Exercise Clause protects." Of course, these
are related preconceptions. These preconceptions are connected to baseline
principles the Court has relied upon in evaluating exemption cases.
As noted above, the popular version of the free exercise exemptions tale
suggests that the Court's initial struggles with the issue led to the development
of a dichotomy between belief and practice.57 Reynolds v. United States is
generally considered a major early precedent for this dichotomy. 8 Essentially,
the dichotomy suggests that belief must be protected in order to have religious
53. RAVITCH, supra note 51, at 35-36.
54. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS: A CRITICAL
HISTORY OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 246-54 (1997) (providing a good example of such a
critique).
55. See, e.g., id.; Richard K. Sherwin, Rhetorical Pluralism and the Discourse Ideal: Countering
Division ofEmploymentv. Smith, A Parable ofPagans, Politics, and Majoritarian Rule, 85 Nw. U. L. REV.
388, 433-37 (1991); cf Mark V. Tushnet, Questioning the Value ofAccommodating Religion, in LAW &
RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 245, 251-53 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000) (arguing that requiring
religious accommodations actually threatens religion).
56. See infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
57. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-78; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
58. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.
[Vol. 44:259266
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freedom, but behavior or practice may be regulated-under generally applicable
laws, in the modem version-for the good of society.59 This dichotomy was
altered in the landmark case of Sherbert v. Verner,6 0 and in turn, this great
advancement was undermined by the Court's decision in Employment Division
v. Smith.61
This account of the evolution and subsequent devolution of free exercise
rights is flawed. Sherbert was not the panacea that it has been made out to be,
and Smith, while seemingly having altered legal doctrine, may simply be a
recognition of what the Court was doing all along.62 Religious minorities
(especially non-Christian religious minorities) did not reap great benefits from
Sherbert;63 moreover, Smith seems consistent with both pre-Sherbert cases,
such as Braunfeld v. Brown, and post-Sherbert cases, such as Goldman v.
Weinberger, Bowen v. Roy, and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association." Thus, if Smith is a flawed decision-and this Article asserts that
it is-the flaw seems inherent in Free Exercise Clause analysis generally. In
this view, Smith is simply an explicit statement of what has been going on all
along, and the infatuation with Sherbert and its progeny has served to obfuscate
that fact.
As discussed above, the Supreme Court's analysis of laws of general
applicability in Smith, and most of the cases that preceded it, is based on the
assumption that a "law of general applicability" in the free exercise context is
really generally applicable. In the end, the Court's approach in Smith was
predetermined-at least in part-by its acceptance of this baseline, notably
without discussion. If the baseline is questionable, the Court's failure to
address it is potentially more problematic than the mental gymnastics it used to
59. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-78; Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166. There is, however, a strong argument that
the law at issue in Reynolds was designed as a mechanism to discriminate against an unpopular religious
minority. See Keith E. Sealing, Polygamists Out of the Closet: Statutory and State Constitutional
Prohibitions Against Polygamy Are Unconstitutional Under the Free Exercise Clause, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
691, 710-16 (2001).
60. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-09 (1963).
61. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-84.
62. William P. Marshall, What Is the Matter with Equality?: An Assessment ofthe Equal Treatment of
Religion and Nonreligion in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 193, 195-96 (2000)
(acknowledging that Smith was not a major shift from the results of earlier post-Sherbert cases even if it was a
major shift in doctrine).
63. FELDMAN, supra note 54, at 218-54.
64. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S.
693 (1986); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
65. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879. It seems obvious that laws that sanction religious practitioners forpracticing
their religion are not generally applicable if one views the issue from the perspective of whether such laws are
generally applicable in regard to religious practice, rather than generally applicable without regard to specific
impacts on religious practice, as the Smith Court viewed the concept. See id. at 890. This is a complex issue
that has been the subject of a great deal of scholarship. Some have suggested that this view of the Free
Exercise Clause is a function of majority dominance. See generally Verna C. Sanchez, All Roads Are Good
Beyond the Lexicon of Christianity in Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 31 (1997);
FELDMAN, supra note 54; Sherwin, supra note 55.
66. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879-82.
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reinterpret Sherbert and Yoder. If evaluating the baseline would lead to the
conclusion that it cannot be reconciled with the horizon of the Free Exercise
Clause, or that an alternative interpretation could be "better" reconciled, the
Court should have considered these possibilities. Yet some form of the
baseline underlying Smith had already been utilized in cases from Braunfeldto
Goldman to Lyng.69
The belief/practice dichotomy and the notion of "laws of general
applicability" make perfect sense to many people. After all, if every religious
faith or denomination was accommodated, many laws would not apply in the
same way to everyone and thus might be harder to enforce.70 This may be so,
but the assertion contains an implicit weighing of values. In this weighing, the
value assigned to application of "generally applicable" laws to all citizens
outweighs the free exercise interests of religious minorities, who are less likely
than dominant faiths to receive exemptions through the legislative process that
gave rise to the "generally applicable" law.7 1 Thus, while the dominant
tradition and values are projected both into the legislative process and the
judicial evaluation of the product of that process in the free exercise context,
minority traditions and values are less likely to be considered or reflected in the
legislative process, and they are outweighed by the interest in "general
applicability" in the judicial process. 72
Under these circumstances, there would appear to be a great imbalance in
the social reality of free exercise rights for members of practice-centered
minority faiths compared to members of more dominant faiths. This is
troubling because it would seem to run counter to First Amendment doctrine,
specifically the counter-majoritarian implications and tradition of the First
Amendment; yet, it should have been expected because many judges are not
equipped to understand the impact on a religious minority of an imposition on
religious practice.
For practice-oriented religions, such as Judaism, the Native American
Church, or Seventh-day Adventism, rules of general applicability can have a
67. The term "horizon" refers to the interpretive horizons of both text and interpreter in Gadamerian
Hermeneutics-in this case to the horizon of the text. See infra text accompanying note 94 (discussing the
concept of interpretive horizons in some detail).
68. The use of the term "better" here does not imply that there is any objective foundation that can
consistently identify "best" or "better" results across times and contexts. See infra text accompanying note 94.
The term is meant to indicate an interpretation in which the horizon of the text and the horizon of the
interpreter are more consistent with each other than another interpretation would be. See infra text
accompanying note 94. This does not mean that other interpretations are not plausible, or that alternative
interpretations might not also be "better" than the one under scrutiny. See infra text accompanying note 94.
69. See Lyng, 485 U.S. 439; Goldman, 475 U.S. 503; Braunfeld, 366 U.S. 599.
70. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. This is essentially the position taken by Justice Scalia. See id. at 872-
90.
71. See id. at 885-86. The Smith Court specifically noted that the political process is the key to
exemptions and may have a negative impact on religious minorities, but the Court viewed such an impact as
an inevitable aspect of the political process. Id at 890; FELDMAN, supra note 54, at 246-49.
72. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
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profound impact, and exemptions would be harder to come by in many areas-
at least prospectively. Goldman v. Weinberger provides a post-Sherbert, but
pre-Smith, example of this.73 Consider also the example of Sunday closing
74laws. These closing laws could be devastating to an Orthodox Jew's or
Seventh-day Adventist's livelihood. She must close her store from Friday
afternoon until sundown Saturday, thus causing the store to be closed during
the best sales period of the week (excluding Sunday). These laws of "general
applicability" are only general if one buys into a particular baseline, that is, if
they apply to everyone the same way. Yet this baseline is open to question. No
mainstream Christian business will face the same impact for religious reasons
as the Jewish or Seventh-day Adventist business because the supposedly neutral
law reflects the prevailing Christian norm.7 5 Interestingly, even if that norm has
shifted to a more secular norm since the situation that gave rise to the Sunday
closing cases in the early 1960s, the new norm may be equally unhelpful to
religious minorities.
The dichotomy between belief and practice reflected in Smith strips the
Free Exercise Clause, at least as it relates to practice-oriented religions, of one
of its most useful purposes: accommodating religious practices when
government action threatens to directly or indirectly penalize those who engage
in such practices. The dominant or majority religious community will
generally be protected because its beliefs will be understood, and perhaps
empathized with, but for religious minorities, quite the opposite might be true.
The Smith Court advocated a majoritarian approach because it will most often
be religious minorities who need to seek exemptions to generally applicable
laws, and it is precisely those same minorities who might have the hardest time
getting exemptions enacted.
73. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 510 (allowing Air Force regulation prohibiting Jewish petitioner from wearing
religious headgear under the First Amendment).
74. See generally McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 452 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing laws
against Establishment Clause challenge); Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 608-09 (upholding Sunday closing laws
against Free Exercise Clause challenge).
75. See FELDMAN, supra note 54, at 263-64. The term "mainstream" is key here, given that several
smaller Christian denominations, such as the Worldwide Church of God, may face similar challenges because
they observe the Sabbath on Friday night and Saturday, and also have prohibitions on working during the
Sabbath. See id
76. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 885-86. Of course, if there is proof of an intent to discriminate against a
religious exercise, religious individual, or denomination, the Free Exercise Clause is still useful. See, e.g.,
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993) (holding that a city
ordinance related to animal sacrifice, targeted to suppress practice ofa religious group, was prohibited under
the Free Exercise Clause). Significantly, the Free Exercise Clause is concerned with government interference
with religious freedom, and such interference is possible with or without the mens rea apparently necessary to
successfully invoke the Clause under Lukumi Babalu Aye. See id.
77. See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 54, at 264-65; FRANK S. RAVITCH, SCHOOL PRAYER AND
DISCRIMINATION: THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES AND DISSENTERS 144-46 (1999).
78. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. In this context the religious majority need not be only one sect or
denomination. There are few places in the United States where a specific sect makes up a statistical majority
of the population. Cf US. Religious Landscape Survey, PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUB. LIFE,
http://religions.pewforum.org/maps (last visited Dec. 20, 2011) (demographic map showing forty-six states
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The irony is that, while Smith has been criticized for this, there is an
assumption in much of that criticism that Smith was a major shift in Free
Exercise Clause jurisprudence. It might be more accurate to suggest that
Smith was a shift in doctrine, not in practice.80 The doctrine espoused in Smith
is inherent in the results and analysis of the Court's free exercise cases, both
before and after Sherbert v. Verner.8' Thus, Smith may simply be an explicit
statement of an interpretive horizon that was influencing results in free exercise
cases even after Sherbert-one that privileges faith or social conformity at the
expense of practice, and religious minority practices in particular.82 In this
view, cases like Wisconsin v. Yoder are the exception, and perhaps they are
only an exception because the dominant faith in those cases reflected idealized
Christian values.
Judges who operate from within the dominant culture and tradition are
likely to undervalue or simply fail to understand religious practices that fall
outside the cultural horizons those judges are accustomed to." This would be
true whether that dominant culture is seen as Christian, secular, or a
combination of both.85 As the philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer suggested, we
are historically situated and affected by the dominant traditions in our society.
Without appropriate reflection-and perhaps even with it-judges are
influenced by their historical situatedness in a culture that has had a dominantly
have no religious majority (at least among Christians)). Four states, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Tennessee-
which have majorities identifying themselves as Evangelical Protestants-and Utah-which has a majority
who identify themselves as Mormons-are the exceptions. Id. Yet an overwhelming majority of the
population may identify with a faith-oriented religious view, even if through a variety of denominations. Id.
After all, a majority of the religiously identifying population in the United States is Protestant, and most are
from faith-oriented denominations. Id. (combining Evangelical Protestant, Mainstream Protestant, and
Historically African American affiliations leads to the conclusion that 51.3% of the U.S. population identifies
as Protestant).
79. See, e.g., Edward M. Gaffney, Jr., The Religion Clause: A Double Guarantee ofReligious Liberty,
1993 BYU L. REV. 189, 210 (1993); Bernard Roberts, Note, The Common Law Sovereignty ofReligious
Lawfinders and the Free Exercise Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 211, 214-15 (1991); cf Stephen Breyer, Judicial
Review: A Practicing Judge's Perspective, 78 TEx. L. REv. 761, 773 (2000) (noting that in Smith, "the Court
disowned the Sherbert test").
80. Gaffney, supra note 79, at 210.
81. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,406-10 (1963). See generally Gaffney, supra note 79, at 200-01,
205-09 (discussing cases from the late nineteenth century in which the Free Exercise Clause did not protect
Mormons from the Court's hostility and cases after Sherbert but before Smith in which the protections of the
Free Exercise Clause slowly eroded away).
82. See FELDMAN, supra note 54, at 248-49.
83. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see FELDMAN, supra note 54, at 246-49.
84. See FELDMAN, supra note 54, at 246-49.
85. See id; see also, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW
AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 3-8 (1993) (describing American culture as privately
religious and publicly secular at the same time); cf JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE
STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 107-16 (1991) (describing two conflicting cultures in the United States, one
highly secular and the other religious (but not only Christian)).
86. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 257-64 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall
trans., The Continuum Publishing Co. 2d rev. ed. 1995) (1960); RAVITCH, supra note 51, at 9-10 (explaining
how the concept of daesin means that our preconceptions are formed by our traditions and these
preconceptions narrow our view of the world).
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Christian influence until relatively recently, and even more recently, has had a
strong secular influence.17 Neither of these historical or social influences tends
to account well for nonmainstream religious practices.
III. No ONE SHOULD BE SURPRISED BY S rITH
Interpretation is always necessary to apply legal concepts in real world
situations. 9 As I have written elsewhere, "[h]ermeneutics are an inescapable
part of everyday life. We are always interpreting, whether we know it or not."90
Many different philosophical approaches recognize this, as have some of the
greatest legal minds to consider the question.9' The philosophical approach I
find most helpful in the judicial context, but still only one of many that roughly
lead to the same conclusion, is that of the philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer. 92 1
have written about Gadamer's approach in a number of contexts,93 and this
section simply boils that discussion down adequately to apply it in the Free
Exercise Clause exemption context. As I wrote in an earlier article:
Gadamer explained that there is no absolute method of interpretation. Each
interpreter brings his or her own preconceptions into the act of interpreting a
text (text can refer to more than just a written text). These preconceptions are
influenced by the tradition, including social context, in which the interpreter
exists. The interpreter's tradition(s) provides her with a horizon that includes
her interpretive predispositions. This horizon is the range of what the
interpreter can see when engaging with a text. The concept of dasein, or
being in the world, captures this dynamic. We exist in the world around us
and that world influences how we view things. Thus, our traditions and
context are a part of our being....
Still, the text has its own horizon of meaning. That horizon is influenced
by the context (or tradition) in which it was written, those influencing or
interpreting it over the passage of time, the words used, and the context of the
original author or authors. Philosophical hermeneutics suggests that to
understand a text, a give and take must occur between text and interpreter-a
dialogue between one's being and the object that one seeks to understand.
87. See CARTER, supra note 85, at 3-11; FELDMAN, supra note 54, at 246-49.
88. See CARTER, supra note 85, at 10-11; FELDMAN, supra note 54, at 246-49.
89. Frank S. Ravitch, Interpreting Scripture/Interpreting Law, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 377,381 (2009).
90. Id. (footnote omitted).
91. See, e.g., CARDozo, supra note 2, at 167-68 (explaining that judges are always interpreting and that
it is not useful to deny the fact that judges must interpret, as many pretend, but rather it is bestto acknowledge
this and to reflect on it).
92. GADAMER, supra note 86, at 257-64.
93. See, e.g., Ravitch, supra note 89, at 381-82; Frank S. Ravitch, Religious Objects as Legal Subjects,
40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1011, 1020-21 (2005); Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to
Neutrality: Broad Principles, Formalism, and the Establishment Clause, 38 GA. L. REV. 489,493-94 (2004).
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This conversation transforms both the text and interpreter as they engage in
the give and take.
The interpreter necessarily projects his or her horizon into the interpretive
process, but should also reflect upon it and the horizon of the text. The
horizon of the text has a binding quality in that if the interpreter openly enters
into dialogue with the text, the horizon of the text will limit the range of
preconceptions the interpreter can project consistently with the horizon of the
text. Since the text and interpreter are engaged in a dialogue to reach a
common truth, neither text nor interpreter is the sole source of meaning.94
This is not a form of relativism as some critics have suggested. 9 5 Through
a dialogue between text and interpreter, one can reach a more informed
understanding of the text than one who does not engage in such dialogue and
simply assigns a reflexive meaning to the text.96 Thus, while there is no
methodological approach to interpretation in Gadamerian hermeneutics, there is
a way for text and interpreter to interact to reach a meaning that is both
consistent with the text and cognizant of the role the interpreter plays in
reaching that meaning.97
If we are embedded creatures-embedded in our traditions and context-
as the concept of dasein suggests, there is no Archimedean point from which
we can say that a given methodology is objective, at least in contested
interpretive contexts. 9 8 This does not mean that judicial decisions are merely
subjective, as some have suggested. 99 In fact, as I have written elsewhere, the
common western legal notion that subjectivity and objectivity are opposites,
and the common western legal implication that they are the only two choices,
create a false antinomy that itself betrays a more useful answer-namely, the
opposite of objectivity, if there is one (and subjectivity as well), is context. 00
As Gadamer suggests, context is neither inherently objective or subjective, but
it affects everything and very much affects judicial decisions.' 0
Part II addressed how interpretive horizons have affected Free Exercise
Clause jurisprudence by reifying a mainstream Christian and secular view of
religion. While the Smith Court's use of precedent was certainly disingenuous,
the underlying reasoning of the decision was not, as some have suggested, an
intentional attempt to privilege majority religious views over others, but rather
it was the result of the influence those religious views have had on the Court's
94. Ravitch, supra note 89, at 381-82 (footnotes omitted).
95. See JEAN GRONDIN, INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 141-42 (Joel Weinsheimer
ed. & trans., Yale Univ. Press 1994) (1991).
96. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 627
(1990).
97. GADAMER, supra note 86, at 267-69.
98. See id. at 257-64.
99. See RAVITCH, supra note 51, at 157 (providing relevant citations to various views).
100. Id
101. See supra text accompanying note 94; GADAMER, supra note 86, at 324-30.
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perspective.10 2 Simply put, the Court essentially read dominant and culturally
embedded notions of religion into the Free Exercise Clause without reflecting
seriously on the role those notions played in forming the Justices'
perspectives. o0 From this viewpoint, one might say that the dissenting Justices
attempted to consider other traditions and contexts in addressing the Free
Exercise Clause question. It is also obvious, however, that the dissenting
Justices simply disagreed with the Court's abandonment of Sherbert and
Yoder.'04 Yet, as mentioned in Part II, those decisions were later minimized by
a majority of the Court in a number of decisions where dominant cultural views
on religion prevailed.o0
Given how hard it is for people to escape their horizons through adequate
reflection, the question remains: Is it possible, or even desirable, for a majority
of any court to escape culturally embedded notions of religion over the long run
in cases interpreting the Free Exercise Clause? Justice Cardozo pointed out
that such reflection is the duty of a good judge, but also explained that it is a
duty too few judges equip themselves to meet.'06 Yet, around the world there
are several examples of courts that have done just that in the context of free
exercise exemptions (or their equivalent in those constitutional systems). 07
The rest of this Article will address one of the best of these opinions, that of the
Japanese Supreme Court. 08 One reason for focusing on the Japanese Supreme
Court decision is that it involves the court accommodating an unpopular
religious group in a nation that is culturally focused on individuals meeting
legal and cultural norms and expectations-the very concerns Justice Scalia
expressed in Smith.'09 Another reason is that one of the relevant provisions in
the Japanese Constitution is partially modeled on U.S. notions of free exercise,
and partially on the earlier Meiji Constitution's religious-freedom provisions 10
Some of the principles reflected in these constitutional provisions were imposed
102. See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-84 (1990).
103. See id.
104. See id at 908-11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
105. See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
106. See generally CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 166-67 (discussing the role each judge's past experience
plays in determining the outcome of a case).
107. See, e.g., Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 8, 1996, 1995 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 74,50 SAIKO SABANSHO
MINJ HANREISHO [MINSHO] 469, 469-70 (Japan); Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys,
[ 1996] 1 S.C.R. 256 (Can.); Edward J. Eberle, Free Exercise ofReligion in Germany and the United States,
78 TUL. L. REv. 1023, 1045 (2004) (discussing a German case in which the court gave preference to religion
over social order).
108. Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 8, 1996, 1995 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 74, 50 SAlKO SAIBANSHO MINJI
HANREISHO [MINSHO] 469, 469-70 (Japan).
109. Compare id, with Smith, 494 U.S. at 879-82.
110. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Eiichiro Takahata, Religious Accommodation in Japan, 2007 BYU L.
REV. 729, 737-38 (2007).
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on the Japanese people after World War 11,11 but they are still well-regarded
principles of freedom in Japan."12
IV. OVERCOMING PRECONCEPTIONS: AN EXAMPLE FROM JAPAN,
MA TSUMOTO V. KOBA YASHI, AND THE REJECTION OF FORMAL NEUTRALITY
AND SMTH-STYLE "GENERAL APPLICABILITY"
Given the above discussion, one might expect that the Japanese courts
would view free exercise in the same way Justice Scalia did when writing for
the majority in Smith. After all, social norms," 3  uniformity in rule
applicability,"l 4 and viewing one's role in light of cultural expectations' are
strong-although certainly not universal-norms in Japan. Individuality in
Japan often takes a back seat to cultural expectations, at least in the public
sphere."16
Moreover, views on religion in Japan are generally inclusive, secular, or
both inclusive and secular." 7  This means that the Japanese generally do not
think it necessary to subscribe to only one faith, or to any faith at all." 8 Many
Japanese are, at the same time, Buddhist, Shinto, and in some ways theistic in
the sense that they believe there is some greater force out there but do not see
the need to define it along sectarian or definite lines.'19 Under this view,
religious requirements may be perceived as somewhat flexible, even as they are
respected.120 Additionally, many Japanese are atheist or agnostic.121
111. DONALD S. LuTz, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 14 (2006).
112. See generally Takahata, supra note 110, at 739-48 (discussing various cases in which courts
permitted free exercise of religion).
113. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONTEMPORARY JAPANESE CULTURE 212 (Sandra Buckley ed., 2002)
(stating that the Japanese "relational model of identity [defines] self as ... a continuum of relations from self
to family to group to nation").
114. See id. (stating that Japanese culture broadly values uniformity in many respects, such that
individualized approaches to relationships are often "treated as a . .. corruption ... of an essential
characteristic of the formation of Japanese identity").
115. See Nancy R. Rosenberger, Introduction to JAPANESE SENSE OF SELF 1, 4 (Nancy R. Rosenberger
ed., paperback ed. 1994) (1992) (stating that the meaning of the Japanese word for self, "jibun," literally
refers to "a part of a larger whole that consists of groups and relationships," implying that the individual is
neither physically nor temporally separate from the larger social world).
116. See ROKUO OKADA, JAPANESE PROVERBS AND PROVERBIAL PHRASES 38 (Tourist Library Series
vol. 20, 1955). A common Japanese expression, "The nail that sticks out gets hammered down," speaks to a
mores that warns against prioritizing one's own desires over group cohesion. Id. This norm is reflected in
many aspects of Japanese society. See id.
117. See William S. Pfeiffer, Cults, Christians, and Confucius: Religious Diversity in Japan, 8 JAPAN
STUDIES ASS'N J. 132, 134 (2010) (stating that Japanese culture places a higher value upon the "practical
benefits of faith and ritual" than it does upon adherence to a specific belief system).
118. Id. at 135 (stating that the Japanese "often belong to or practice several different religions
simultaneously, each of which satisfies different purposes and addresses different parts of their life").
119. Id.
120. See id. (analogizing the mainstream Japanese perspective on religion to restaurant dining
preferences: "[a]n apt metaphor might be a restaurant buffet, which they prefer over a set menu... [because]
many Japanese draw from diverse faiths and belief systems depending on the time of life and situation").
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Despite the issues of ethnic discrimination that Japan has struggled
with,122 religious intolerance is not generally a problem in Japan. 123 The one
religious trait that many Japanese people do find troubling is proselytization.124
To many Japanese people, it is viewed as intolerant to try to change other
people because there is only one way to be saved, etc. 12 5 This is highly relevant
given the faith of the plaintiff in the leading Japanese religious exemption case
discussed below.
Japanese perceptions of cultural uniformity, and somewhat flexible views
about religious duties, would seem to create a great likelihood that religious
exemptions to generally applicable laws would not be ordered by Japanese
courts. Of course, one might argue that the Japanese culture's strong religious
tolerance might point toward granting religious exemptions; however, the
United States is supposedly a land of religious tolerance, and that did not keep
Justice Scalia and the Smith majority from fearing that mandatory exemptions
would potentially make each person a law unto himself or herself.'2 6 Each
person being a law unto himself or herself would be particularly troubling in
Japan where individuality tends to bend to cultural expectation in the public
sphere.
Yet the Japanese Supreme Court, when faced with such a case, engaged in
reasoning that is virtually the opposite of the reasoning in Smith. In Matsumoto
v. Kobayashi, often referred to as the Kobe Technical College Case because
that college was the defendant in the suit, a Petty Bench of the Japanese
Supreme Court required the college to accommodate a Jehovah's Witness who
would not engage in Kendo, one of the college's physical education
requirements. 12 The Japanese Supreme Court reasoned that for everyone to
have free exercise of religion, as expressed in the Japanese Constitution,
accommodations are appropriate because, for some people, a seemingly neutral
121. See N.J. DEMERATH 111, CROSSING THE GODS: WORLD RELIGIONS AND WORDLY POLITICS 138
(2001) (stating that 87% of the Japanese population has never considered membership in a religious
organization).
122. See Chris Hogg, Japan Racism "Deep and Profound, " BBC NEWS (July 11, 2005), http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hilasia-pacific/4671687.stm (U.N. analyst expresses concern regarding discrimination against some
ethnic minorities in Japan).
123. See DEP'T OF STATE, 108TH CONG., ANN. REP. ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 2004, at 195
(Comm. Print 2005) ("[There exists a] generally amicable relationship among religions in [Japanese]
society.").
124. See Robert J. Kisala & Mark R. Mullins, Introduction to RELIGION AND SOCIAL CRISIS IN JAPAN:
UNDERSTANDING JAPANESE SOCIETY THROUGH THE AUM AFFAIR 1, 10 (Robert J. Kisala & Mark R. Mullins
eds., 2001).
125. See id. (discussing how "proselytization activities" are not generally well-received by the Japanese
people).
126. See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
127. See Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 8, 1996,1995 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 74, 50 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI
HANREISHO [MINSHO] 469, 473-75 (Japan); see also Takahata, supra note 110, at 742-45 (providing an
excellent discussion of the case in English); Overview ofthe Judicial System in Japan, SUPREME COURT OF
JAPAN, http://www.courts.go.jp/english/system/system.html#02 (last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (explaining
jurisdiction of the Japanese Supreme Court and court structure, including Petty Benches and the Grand
Bench).
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law can interfere with freedom of religion.128 The court held that such
accommodations must be balanced against the interests of others and society,
but that the government must have a very good reason to infringe on the
interests of the religious individual.129 The court also explained that such
accommodations are a way to prevent a negative impact on the religious person
created by the law.13 0 Most importantly, to the extent that an accommodation
allows the religious person to avoid a requirement or hardship, the government
may require an equally demanding alternative.' 3 1
This reasoning demonstrates two inherent flaws in the Smith Court's
reasoning: first is the idea that the general applicability of laws of "general
applicability" should be determined without regard to the impact they have on
religious people; and second is the assumption that mandatory exemptions
create some sort of windfall for the exempted individual rather than equalizing
things (at least once the government imposes an alternative requirement).
It is important to note that the Japanese Supreme Court ordered an
exemption in the case before it and held that such an exemption does not create
an establishment of religion.132 The court did not, however, hold that
exemptions are always mandated because that issue was not before the court.'
This has to do with Japanese legal approaches and the nature of the claim. In
Japan, the Supreme Court can decide the issue before it, but to avoid a case by
case approach, the legislature must pass a law that would make the norm
applicable nationwide-assuming it is constitutional-or within the territory of
local legislatures that pass such laws.134 Still, the test the court used
demonstrates that exemptions are appropriate under the Japanese Constitution
when a general law interferes with religious practices, subject to the balancing
of interests.135 In fact, since the case was decided, there have been laws passed
that require accommodation, and Japanese courts have upheld those laws.1 3 6
Given the U.S. Supreme Court's nearly consistent failure to recognize free
exercise exemptions going back more than a century, how is it that the Japanese
Supreme Court so clearly saw what a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court has
often failed to see? That is, religious exemptions need not interfere with
orderly society, and exemptions are not windfalls but rather may be a way to
equalize the burdens imposed by laws that reflect the majority's social and
religious norms, but not lesser known religious norms. I will make a
128. See Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 8, 1996, 1995 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 74,50 SAlKO SAIBANSHO MINJI
HANREISHO [MINSHOI 469, 476-79 (Japan).
129. Id at 473-79.
130. Id. at 476-80.
131. Id. at 479.
132. Takahata, supra note 110, at 742-45.
133. Id.
134. HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 27-30, 32-40 (3rd ed. 2009).
135. See Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 8, 1996, 1995 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 74, 50 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI
HANREISHO [MINSHO] 469 (Japan).
136. See generally Takahata, supra note 110, at 745-58 (discussing statutory policies that the Japanese
Government had implemented).
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controversial assertion here: namely, the reason is that the U.S. Supreme Court
is more affected by dualistic Western and Christian norms, even if only as a
matter of cultural traditions, and (this is the most controversial part) the Smith,
Braunfeld, Reynolds, etc., majorities were unable or unwilling to adequately
reflect to see beyond their horizons. This is clear from the reasoning in those
cases, as opposed to the holdings, because it would be possible to adequately
reflect and still come to the same conclusions those courts did by using
different reasoning. Lest there be any doubt, I am suggesting that the Smith,
Goldman, Lyng, Braunfeld, Reynolds, Davis, etc., Courts simply engaged in
reflexive analysis of the underlying issues, and thus, the answers in those cases
were predetermined, even in a case like Smith that required logical gymnastics
in light of precedent.
None of this says anything about how those Courts should have ruled on
the issue. Rather, it suggests that those Courts never seriously considered the
central issues of the relationship between belief and practice in many religions,
nor did those Courts consider the core issue of what it means to say that a law is
generally applicable in the free exercise context. The Japanese Supreme Court,
however, seemed aware of both of these issues. 137 The Japanese Court did not
share many of the religious and cultural presuppositions of a heavily
Christianized and secularized society, yet it did, at least potentially, share those
of a highly secularized society.
Does this mean that there is no escape from the sort of reasoning we have
seen in numerous U.S. Supreme Court free exercise decisions? No. The
Japanese Court may not have shared the same horizon as the U.S. Court, but
still its horizon would have seemed equally likely to lead to the same result as
that in Smith and its predecessors. Yet it didn't. From a legal-reasoning
standpoint, this is because the Japanese Court considered what it means to call
a law what the U.S. Court labeled "generally applicable" in the free exercise
context and because it seems to have considered the seriousness of religious
practice.139
Another factor some might point to is that the Japanese Court used a
balancing approach, whereas Justice Scalia and several justices in the Smith
majority tended toward formalism.14 0 This, however, explains little. First,
several of the Courts in pre-Smith decisions leaned more toward balancing than
formalism and yet used formalistic approaches that are at least consistent with
137. See Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 8, 1996, 1995 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 74, 50 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI
HANREISHO [MINSHO] 469 (Japan).
138. See DEMERATH Hf, supra note 121, at 138 (stating that 87% of the Japanese population has never
considered membership in a religious organization).
139. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 880 (1990) (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-61
(1982)); see Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 8, 1996, 1995 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 74, 50 SAIKO SAtBANSHO MINJI
HANREISHO [MINSHO] 469 (Japan).
140. Compare Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 8, 1996, 1995 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 74, 50 SAIKO SAtBANSHO
MINJI HANREISHO [MINSHO] 469 (Japan), with Smith, 494 U.S. at 876-90; see also RAVITCH, supra note 51,
at 32-34 (explaining that the Smith Court relied on "formal neutrality").
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Smith.14 1 Moreover, the Japanese Supreme Court often prefers formalism to
balancing approaches. 142
No doubt formalism played a role in Smith and a number of other
decisions, but the horizons of the Justices on these issues helped enable
formalism to gain a majority by presuming the answers to the key questions
mentioned above.
What the Japanese Supreme Court opinion teaches us is that it is possible
for courts to adequately reflect on their horizons and to expand them in light of
the text (case) they are addressing, but as Justice Cardozo pointed out, this is
not easy.14 3 And while the Japanese Court is to be credited for doing it, no one
should be surprised that the Smith Court did not. 1" In the end, dasein is a
powerful and embedded force, and when dasein reflects Western and Christian
dualisms, it can be particularly problematic in enabling courts to even see the
key questions in exemption cases. 145 The results in cases like Smith, however,
would be less troubling, I think, if the Court had openly confronted the key
questions to which it assumed answers, openly addressed the contradictory
precedent which might have forced it to confront at least the question of what
perspective general applicability should be viewed from, and then came to
whatever conclusion it did based on such open reasoning.
Apparently, in many American courts this is too much to ask for, but at
least in Japan, Germany, Canada, and elsewhere, there are examples of courts
openly confronting their horizons.14 6 I mention the latter countries because
some might argue that the Japanese Supreme Court decision may have been
easier to reach because the country is more religiously homogeneous. The same
cannot be said of modem Germany or Canada.14 7 Moreover, I would suggest
that in a more norm-oriented and homogeneous country, the task of expanding
horizons about nonmainstream religions should be harder. If the idea is that
exempting in a more homogeneous country is less problematic, the argument
proves too much. First, it does not answer why the Smith Court didn't even
address key underlying questions.148 Second, even when Sherbert and Yoder
141. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-36 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 401-10
(1963).
142. See Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance: The Hidden Problems of Corporate Law
and Their Solutions, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 195 (2000).
143. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
144. See supra Part 111.
145. See GADAMER, supra note 86, at 257-64.
146. See Multani v. Comm'n scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 (Can.); Saika
Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 8, 1996, 1995 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 74, 50 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHO
[MINSHO] 469 (Japan); MECfor Educ. Kwazulu-Natal v. Pillay, 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) at paras. 46-114 (S.
Afr.); Eberle, supra note 107, at 1076-79; Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the Reality of American
Constitutional Exceptionalism, 107 MICH. L. REv. 391, 404-06 (2008).
147. Germany: International Religious Freedom Report 2004, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, www.state.gov/g/
drVrls/irf/2004/35456.htm (last visited Dec. 20,2011); see Religious Diversity in Canada, POLICY RESEARCH
INITIATIVE, Gov'T OF CAN., http://www.horizons.gc.ca/2009-0008 eng.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2012).
148. See supra Part I.
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set forth the governing principles in free exercise exemption cases, there was
not a flood of exemption claims in the United StateS.149 Thus, when practical
reality is considered, there is not a huge difference between more religiously
heterogeneous countries like the U.S. and Canada, and more religiously
homogeneous countries like Japan, which also has not experienced a "flood" of
exemption claims since Kobayashi.50 Finally, even if such a flood were a
concern, the Japanese Supreme Court provided a solution which could limit the
flood, one that the U.S. Supreme Court never even considered: requiring the
person seeking an exemption to meet an alternative requirement that does not
burden his or her religious free exercise."s'
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that no one should have been surprised by the
Smith decision despite earlier decisions like Sherbert and Yoder. This does not
mean that Smith is a good decision; rather, it means that it reflects embedded
Western, Christocentric, and secular-centric horizons. Sadly, the Smith Court
could have engaged in more reflective analysis and decided the case either way,
because, as the Japanese Supreme Court demonstrated in Matsumoto v.
Kobayashi, it is possible for a court to adequately reflect to expand its horizon
in cases involving free exercise exemptions-even in the face of contrary
culturally embedded preconceptions.152 Justice Cardozo would have been
proud ... of the Japanese court, not the Smith Court.
149. See RAVITCH, supra note 51, at 33-34.
150. Takahata, supra note 110, at 749 (noting that litigation is not as favored in Japan as it is in the U.S.).
151. Saikd Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 8, 1996, 1995 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 74, 50 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI
HANREISHO (MINSHO] 469, 479 (Japan).
152. See id
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